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INTRODUCTION
Insight Assets, Inc. ("Insight Assets") initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint
against Farias seeking declaratory relief and an in rem judicial foreclosure. Insight
Assets asserted its interest in the Property under a prior trust deed that was executed by a
former owner of the property. As part of its request for relief, Insight Assets sought
"costs, and expenses of collection, including reasonable attorney fees" as allowed
pursuant to the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed. Farias asserted that he was a bona fide
purchaser for value and that he took title to the property free and clear of any purported
interest that Insight Assets had to the property. Because the litigation was based upon a
writing that provided for an award of attorney fees to one of the parties, Farias asserted
that he was entitled to his reasonable attorney fees under Utah's reciprocal fee statute,
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78B-5-826 (2011).

Although the trial court granted summztry judgment in favor of Farias, finding that
he was a bona fide purchaser, the trial court refused to award attorney fees to Farias
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826. The trial court erred in failing to award attorney
fees to Farias because it misinterpreted and misapplied the reciprocal fee statute.
Although this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals has explicitly held that the reciprocal
attorney fees statute merely requires a party to the litigation assert the writing's
enforceability, the trial court required that the parties also be parties to the contract

i

containing the attorney fees provision. Because the trial court misinterpreted and
misapplied the statute, the trial court's refusal to award attorney fees should be reversed.
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4

ARGUMENT
L

INSIGHT ASSETS DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5826 IS CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW.
As set forth in the Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant Homero Farias, the trial

court misread and misapplied Utah case law and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 in
denying Farias' request for attorney fees in this matter. The trial court ruled that in order
to be entitled to attorney fees under Section 78B-5-826, one must be a party to the
original contract. [R. 578.] Specifically, the trial court held an award of attorney fees
was not warranted because it would not help in "' creating a level playing field' between
contractual parties." See Ruling [R. 578] (emphasis added). The trial court's inclusion
of an additional requirement, that the parties must also be parties to the contract, is not
supported by Utah law. Indeed, in Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041, this
Court emphasized that the reciprocal fee statute "requires only that a party to the
litigation assert the writing's enforceability as basis for recovery." 2007 UT 26, If 15
(emphasis added). This Court also held that a court may award attorney fees to the
prevailing party where "the litigation was based on a writing that granted attorney fees to
at least one of the parties in the litigation." Id. at ^f 16 (emphasis added). The Utah Court
of Appeals has explicitly held that a non-party to the contract could recover attorney fees
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 because "the statute 'requires only that a party to
the litigation assert the [contract's] enforceability as a basis for recovery." Hooban v.
Unicity Int% Inc., 2009 UT App 287, *{ 9, 220 P.3d 485 (alteration and emphasis in
original).
2
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Not once in Insight Assets' reply brief, does Insight Assets assert that the trial
court correctly ruled that one must be a party to the original contract to be entitled to
attorney fees. Insight Assets also fails to point the Court to any case law supporting the
analysis of the trial court. Indeed, Insight Assets could not take such a position when it
argued below, and argues before this Court, that it is entitled to attorney fees it has
incurred pursuant to the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed, even though it was not an
original party to the contracts.
Instead, Insight Assets argues that Farias is not entitled to his attorney fees
because (1) Insight Assets, not Farias, was the prevailing party and (2) there is no uneven
playing field because Insight Assets could only recover attorney fees against Farias'
Property, not against Farias personally. As set forth below, both of these alternative
arguments to uphold the trial court's ruling fail on the merits.
II.

FARIAS, NOT INSIGHT ASSETS, IS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THIS
LITIGATION.
Insight Assets argues, for the first time on appeal, that regardless of whether Farias

prevails on his quiet title claim and defeats Insight Assets' judicial foreclosure claim, the
trial court should have determined that Insight Assets was the prevailing party because it
is entitled to a deficiency judgment against the Boecks under the Trust Deed Note.
Insight Assets, purportedly relying on Ellsworth Paulsen Contr. Co. v. 51-SPR, LLC,
2006 UT App 353, 144 P.3d 261, argues that if Insight Assets prevails on some of its
claims "brought under a common core of facts," that it is entitled to all of its attorney fees
reasonably incurred in the litigation. Because Insight Assets failed to make this argument
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below, it cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d
1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). Even if the issue was properly before the Court, which it is not,
Insight Assets' argument is contrary to the both the findings of the trial court and
applicable law. As set forth below, Insight Assets' argument fails because Insight Assets
has not prevailed on any of its claims under the contract because the Boecks were not
parties to this lawsuit and, even if Insight Assets had prevailed against the Boecks, Farias
would still be entitled to his attorney fees because he prevailed on all claims between him
and Insight Assets.
Insight Assets cannot be considered the prevailing party where it has not prevailed
on any of the claims brought in the lawsuit. Insight Assets argues that it is the prevailing
party because it is entitled to prevail against the Boecks, the borrowers under the Phalen
Trust Deed, under a claim for deficiency judgment. The Boecks, however, were not
named in the lawsuit below, Insight Assets did not assert any causes of action against
them, and the trial court and this Court have no jurisdiction over the Boecks to enter a
deficiency judgment against them. See Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1281 (10th Cir.
2008) ("It is a fundamental rule of civil procedure that one who was not a party to an
action is not bound by the judgment"). Insight Assets refers the Court to Russell v. Hank,
34 P. 245 (Utah 1893), to support its claim that this Court can enter a deficiency
judgment against the Boecks even though Insight Assets did not plead a claim for a
deficiency judgment and did not name the Boecks in the lawsuit. In Russell, however,
the defendant was named and served in the lawsuit; therefore, the court had jurisdiction
over him to enter the deficiency judgment. 34 P. 245, 245.
4
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In this case, Insight Assets has not sought to enforce its claims against the Boecks,
instead electing to pursue claims solely against Farias and the Property. Insight Assets
cannot prevail on a claim that was not asserted against the Boecks, who are not before the
trial court. Insight Assets lost on all claims brought in this lawsuit and cannot be
considered the prevailing party.
Second, even if Insight Assets could prevail against the Boecks on a deficiency
claim, Farias would still be the prevailing party as between it and Insight Assets because
Farias prevailed on his quiet title claim and defeated Insight Assets' claim for judicial
foreclosure on his property. Courts have recognized the general rule that "attorney fees
and costs in multi-party cases as well as in certain consolidated cases are awarded to
different parties on the basis of the separate judgments obtained, not the overall trial
result." See, e.g., Tulsa Litho Co. v. Tile and Decorative Surfaces Magazine Publ'g, Inc.,
69 F.3d 1041, 1043 (10th Cir. 1995); Scott v. ArtofOptiks

Cherry Creek Inc., 60 P.3d

770, 771 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) ("To hold otherwise would produce an unfair and absurd
result, preventing recovery of attorney fees by a party who successfully defends against
all claims against it simply because the opposing party prevailed on claims against other
parties."); Christie-Lambert Van & Storage Co., Inc. v. McLeod, 693 P.2d 161, 166
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984). In Tulsa Litho, the plaintiff brought claims against three
companies for breach of contract and against the president of the companies under an
alter ego theory. 69 F.3d 1041, 1042. The court granted summary judgment to the
president on the alter ego claims and after trial, a judgment was entered against the three
companies for breach of contract. Id. The Tenth Circuit held, under this scenario, the
5
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plaintiff was entitled to its attorney fees against the companies, but that the president was
entitled to his attorney fees against the plaintiff because the president had prevailed on
the claims made against him, even though the plaintiff ultimately prevailed against the
companies. Id. at 1043.
A similar result is mandated in this case. Even if Insight Assets had prevailed
against the Boecks, had it named them in the lawsuit, Farias prevailed on all claims made
between him and Insight Assets. Therefore, Farias is the prevailing party as between him
and Insight Assets and is entitled to his reasonable attorney fees incurred in this matter.

III. THE CONDITIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN §
78B-5-826 ARE MET IN THIS CASE.
In its opposition brief, Insight Assets argues that the conditions for attorney fees
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 are not met in this case because Insight Assets was
not in default under the terms of the Trust Deed Note or Phalen Trust Deed. Insight
Assets argument is based upon a misreading of Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009
UT 2, 201 P.3d 966. In Giusti, the court found that the reciprocal attorney fee statute was
inapplicable because the contract did not create an unequal exposure to attorney fees to
either party. 2009 UT 2, ^ | 76-77. The attorney fees provision in Giusti stated that "[i]n
the event either party defaults" the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to recover its
fees. Id. at ^f 72.
In this case, however, the attorney fees provisions contained in the Trust Deed
Note and Trust Deed are unilateral and create an unequal litigation risk because they
allow only the holder of the trust deed and note to recover attorney fees. The necessary
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conditions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 have been met in this case because the
underlying litigation is based upon contracts, the Trust Deed Note and the Phalen Trust
Deed, and the contracts allow at least one party to recover attorney fees. See Hooban,
2009 UT App 287,19; Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26,114.
IV.

THE UNDERLYING POLICIES OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826
SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IN THIS CASE.
Although the reciprocal attorney fees statute allows the trial court to exercise its

discretion in awarding attorney fees, this court has held that "district courts should award
fees liberally under Utah Code section [78B-5-826] where pursuing or defending an
action results in an unequal exposure to the risk of contractual liability for attorney fees."
Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, ^j 19. This Court has identified two underlying policies behind
the reciprocal attorney fees statute. First, the statute remedies "the unequal allocation of
litigation risks." Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, If 18 (emphasis added). "[E]xposure to the risk
of a contractual obligation to pay attorney fees must give rise to a corresponding risk of a
statutory obligation to pay fees." Id. at 119. Second, the statute "rectifies the inequitable
common law result where a party that seeks to enforce a contract containing an attorney
fees clause has a significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to invalidate the
contract." Id. at f 18.
Insight Assets argues for the first time on appeal that the underlying policies
behind UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 do not support an award of attorney fees because
Farias could not be personally liable for attorney fees where Insight Assets' judicial
foreclosure action was in rem. Because Insight Assets failed to make this argument
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below, it cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d at
1022. Even if the issue was properly before the Court, which it is not, Insight Assets'
argument is contrary to applicable law.
Insight Assets argues that there is no uneven playing field because Insight Assets
could only recover attorney fees against Farias' Property and not against Farias
personally. In doing so, Insight Assets attempts to place emphasis that its claim was in
rem and that it could not obtain an attorney fees award from Farias directly. In Saucedo
v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Ass % 168 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Cal Ct. App. 1980), the court dealt
with facts very similar to this case in which the holder of a trust deed sought to enforce
the trust deed against a subsequent purchaser of the property. 168 Cal. Rptr. at 553-54.
After the current owner of the property prevailed, the holder of the trust deed, like Insight
Assets in this case, argued that the current homeowner was not entitled to attorney fees
under the reciprocal fee statue because the current homeowner could not be personally
liable for the attorney fees because they did not personally sign the note or trust deed. Id.
at 554. The court recognized that California's reciprocal attorney fees statute1 would
apply because the holder of the trust deed would be able to recover its fees as a condition
to redemption if the subsequent purchaser wished to protect his equity in the property.

1

California's reciprocal fee statute provides in the germane portion:
(a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that
attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall
be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the
party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether
he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717 (West 2012).
8
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Id. at 555. In short, the court held that it was irrelevant whether the attorney fees would
be paid out of the party's property or their pocket. The court stated
While we adhere to our conclusion that [the reciprocal fee statute] was not
intended to extend the right to recover attorney fees to persons who
themselves could not have been required to pay attorney fees in the event
their adversary prevailed in the action, we are persuaded that in every case
in which the non-assuming grantee has a sufficient interest in the property
to warrant his resisting foreclosure, he would as a real and practical matter
be required to pay reasonable attorney fees incurred by trustee and/or
beneficiary should they prevail in the action to prevent foreclosure.
Id.
Similarly in this case, if Insight Assets had prevailed, Farias would have been
forced to pay Insight Assets' attorney fees to redeem the Property or he would have lost
his interest and equity in the Property. The practical liability for attorney fees under the
unilateral attorney fees provisions creates an unequal litigation risk that UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-5-826 was designed to prevent. Because defending the action subjected
Farias to an unequal exposure to the risk of attorney fees, Farias should be awarded his
reasonable attorney fees under Section 78B-5-826. See Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, f 19
(noting that "district courts should award fees liberally under Utah Code section [78B-5826] where pursuing or defending an action results in an unequal exposure to the risk of
contractual liability for attorney fees.").
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Farias respectfully requests the Court to overturn
the District Court's denial of Farias' request for attorney fees pursuant to UTAH CODE
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ANN. § 78B-5-826, and remand this case to the District Court with instructions to
determine and award the reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred by Farias.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2012.
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C.

onald G. Russell
Rodger M. Burge
Jeffery A. Balls
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